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Abstract
Deep neural networks are known to be vulnerable to in-
puts with maliciously constructed adversarial perturbations
aimed at forcing misclassification. We study randomized
smoothing as a way to both improve performance on unper-
turbed data as well as increase robustness to adversarial
attacks. Moreover, we extend the method proposed by He
et al. [16] by adding low-rank multivariate noise, which
we then use as a base model for smoothing. The proposed
method achieves 58.5% top-1 accuracy on CIFAR-10 under
PGD attack and outperforms previous works by 4%. In addi-
tion, we consider a family of attacks, which were previously
used for training purposes in the certified robustness scheme.
We demonstrate that the proposed attacks are more effective
than PGD against both smoothed and non-smoothed models.
Since our method is based on sampling, it lends itself well
for trading-off between the model inference complexity and
its performance. A reference implementation of the proposed
techniques is provided.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are showing spectacular
performance in a variety of computer vision tasks, but at the
same time are susceptible to adversarial examples – small
perturbations that alter the prediction [14, 32]. Since the
initial discovery of this phenomenon in 2013, growingly
stronger defences [14, 14, 16, 21, 26, 30, 31, 39, 41] and
counter-attacks [3, 6, 9, 14, 22, 26, 28, 29] were proposed
in the literature. Adversarial attacks have also been shown
in tasks beyond image classification where they were first
discovered, object detection [34], natural language process-
∗Equal contribution.
ing [8, 11, 19], reinforcement learning [13], speech-to-text
[7], and point cloud classification [38] just to mention a few.
Gilmer et al. [12] argued that adversarial examples are an in-
evitable property of high dimensional data manifolds rather
than a weakness of specific models. In view of this, the true
goal of an adversarial defence is not to getting rid of the
existence of adversarial examples but rather making their
search hard. In particular, adding randomness to the network
can be particularly successful [5, 16, 24], since information
acquired from previous runs cannot be directly applied to a
current run.
Contribution. While previous works discuss randomized
smoothing in the context of certified robustness [10, 30], in
this work we consider it as a viable method to increase both
the performance and adversarial robustness of a base model.
In particular, we propose a generalization of parametric noise
injection (PNI) [16] which we term colored PNI (CPNI), and
utilize it as a base model. We demonstrate that randomized
smoothing brings significant improvement in accuracy in
both the presence and the absense of an adversarial attack.
We discuss several methods of smoothing and ways to
optimize a pre-trained model and improve the accuracy of the
smoothed classifier. We view smoothing as a transformation
of the data space that “smooths” the decision boundaries of
the classifier. Such a transformation can be considered as a
way of enforcing a smoothness prior of the underlying data
distribution classifications boundaries (which is usually the
case for naturally occurring distribution).
2. Related work
In these section, we briefly review the notions of white
and black box attacks and describe the existing approaches
for adversarial defence and certified defence.
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Adversarial attacks. Adversarial attacks were first pro-
posed by Szegedy et al. [32], who noted that it was possible
to use the gradients of a neural network to discover small
perturbations which drastically change its outputs. It is com-
mon to divide adversarial attacks into two classes: white
box attacks, allowing access to the internals of the model
(in particular, its gradients); and black box attacks allowing
access only to the outputs of the model for a given input.
Another useful division is into targeted attacks – ones that
attempt to make the model predict a specific predefined class
(target) instead of the real one, as opposed to untargeted
attacks that only try to degrade the classifier performance.
White box attacks. One of the oldest and simplest white
box adversarial attacks is the fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) [14], which makes use of special properties of the
L∞ norm and thus utilizes the (normalized) sign of the gra-
dient as an adversarial perturbation:
xˆ = x+  · sign(∇xL), (1)
where x and xˆ denote the clean and the perturbed inputs,
respectively, L is the loss function that the perturbed input
shall maximize, and  is the desired attack strength.
Madry et al. [26] proposed to use iterative optimization –
specifically, projected gradient ascent, to find stronger adver-
sarial examples:
xˆk = ΠB(x,)
[
xˆk−1 + α · sign(∇xL)
]
. (2)
The projection operator Π restricts the perturbed input to
be in some vicinity B(x, ) of the unperturbed input. The
interations are initialized with xˆ0 = x. This attack, referred
to as PGD in the literature, is one of the most powerful L∞
attacks up to date.
MultiTargeted attack [15] iterates over classes s ∈ S and
applies a targeted PGD with each s as target. This simple
change gives a notable improvement in different settings.
Carlini and Wagner [6] proposed a family of attacks using
other norm constraints, in particular, the L0, L2 and L∞
norms. For that, they solve a minimization problem
min‖δ‖+ cL(x+ δ). (3)
In contrast to FGSM and PGD, which have a strict bound on
the attack norm, the C&W attack always succeeds, but the
norm of the perturbation is unbounded.
Rony et al. [29] proposed to decouple norm and direction
optimization, motivated by the fact that finding the adversar-
ial example in a predefined region is a simpler task. Their
DDN attack iteratively changes the norm depending on the
success of a previous step:
xˆk = ΠB(x,k)
[
xˆk−1 + α ·∇xL
]
(4)
k = (1 + s · γ)k−1, (5)
where s = −1 if xˆk−1 is misclassified and s = 1 otherwise.
Black box attacks. A simplest way to attack a model F
without accessing its gradients is to train a substitute model
F ′ to predict the outputs of F [28] and then use its gradients
to apply any of the available white box attacks. Liu et al. [25]
extended this idea to transferring the adversarial examples
from one model (or ensemble of models) to another, not
necessary distilled one from another.
Other works propose alternative methods to estimate gra-
dients: ZOO [9] makes a numerical estimation, NATTACK
[22] uses natural evolution strategies [36], and BayesOpt [2]
employs Gaussian processes.
Adversarial defences. Szegedy et al. [32] proposed to
generate adversarial examples during training and use them
for training adversarially robust models, optimizing the loss
Ladv(x) = (1− w) · LCE(x) + w · LCE(xˆ), (6)
where LCE is the cross-entropy loss, xˆ is the adversarial
example and w is a hyperparameter usually set to w = 0.5.
The method is particularly convenient if the generation
of adversarial examples is fast [14]. Moreover, this method,
combined with stronger attacks, provides a powerful baseline
for adversarial defences [26], and is utilized as a part of
defence procedure in many modern defences.
Xie et al. [39] proposed a feature denoising mechanism
inspired by self-attention [33] and non-local blocks [35].
Sarkar et al. [31] introduced loss terms which enforce linear
structure and Lipschitz continuity of the network.
Many works proposed improvements over regular adver-
sarial training by applying stronger attacks during the adver-
sarial training phase. For example, Khoury and Hadfield-
Menell [21] proposed to use Voronoi cells instead of -balls
as a possible space for adversarial examples in the train-
ing phase. The authors argue that this setting has many
advantages over regular -balls, being better suited for low-
dimensional data manifold embedded into high dimensional
spaces, and providing a full partition of the space. Liu et al.
[23] added adversarial noise to all the activations and not
only to the input. Jiang et al. [18] proposed to use learning-
to-learn framework, training an additional DNN to generate
adversarial examples, which is used to adversarially train the
classifier, resembling GAN training. Balaji et al. [4] heuris-
tically updated per-image attack strength i, decreasing it if
attack succeeded and increasing otherwise.
Randomization of the neural network can be a very pow-
erful adversarial defence, since, even providing access to
gradients, the attacker does not have access to the network,
but rather some randomly perturbed version thereof. One of
the first works involving randomization Zheng et al. [42] pro-
posed to improve robustness by reducing distance between
two samples differing by a normally distributed variable with
a small variance. Zhang and Liang [41] proposed to add
normal noise to the input, which is shown to reduce KL di-
vergence between non-perturbed and adversarial inputs. An
important improvement to PGD adversarial training is para-
metric noise injection (PNI) [16]. PNI improves robustness
of the network by injecting Gaussian noise to parameters
(weights or activations) and learning the noise strength.
Athalye et al. [3] made an important observation that
many defences do not imrove robustness of the defended net-
work but rather obfuscate gradients, making gradient-based
optimization methods less effective. They identify common
properties of obfuscated gradients and organize them in a
checklist. In addition, they propose techniques to overcome
common instances of obfuscated gradients: in particualar,
approximating non-differentiable functions with a differen-
tiable substitute and using averaging on the randomize ones.
Certified defences. Certified defences, first proposed by
Wong and Kolter [37], should give robustness guarantees
for a classifier by proving the performance under norm-
bounded perturbations. In particular, randomized methods
were shown to be especially efficient, and Cohen et al. [10]
has shown a tight bound onL2 certification by applying a ran-
dom sampling technique. Consequently, Salman et al. [30]
used the smoothed classifier to generate stronger “smoothed”
adversarial attacks, and utilize them for adversarial training.
Such training allows to produce more accurate base classi-
fier, and as a result, improve certified robustness properties.
Anonymous [1] proposed adversarial training based on layer-
wise provable optimization via convex relaxation, applying
adversarial training in non-randomized certification settings
and improving non-randomized certification results.
3. Randomized smoothing
Recently, a line of works [10, 30, 37] has shown certain
theoretical guarantees on adversarial robustness. In particu-
lar, a certified defense proposed by Cohen et al. [10] is based
on randomized smoothing and can guarantee the accuracy
of 49% on ImageNet for perturbations with the L2 norm
bounded by 0.5. A smooth classifier g assigns x the class
label that the base classifier f is most likely to return for x
under Gaussian pertubation η,
g(x) = arg max
y
P (f(x+ η) = y)
η ∼ N (0, σ2I). (7)
Since the outcome of the smoothed classifier cannot be evalu-
ated directly, it is approximated with a Monte-Carlo method,
i.e., by averaging over a number of points sampled from the
distribution.
Since the smoothing is independent of the architecture of
the base classifier, we can take any (robust) model and test
the overall improvement provided by smoothing. We will
denote by M the number of the samples for Monte-Carlo
approximation. Notice that for an input of b samples, the
base classifier needs to evaluate a total of bM samples.
In what follows, we describe three different realizations of
smoothing, which differ in the way of combining predictions
of individual samples into the final prediction.
3.1. Prediction smoothing
In this case, we generate predictions for each of the M
samples independently and then perform voting; we output
the most frequent prediction among the samples:
g(x) = arg max
y
M∑
i=1
1
[
arg max
y′
fi,y′(x) = y
]
, (8)
where g(x) is output of smoothed model and fi,y(x) is
probability of class y predicted for the i-th sample x+ ηi.
This is the smoothing method that was previously dis-
cussed by Cohen et al. [10] and Salman et al. [30] for cer-
tified robustness. By taking into account the M votes, the
accuracy of the classifier was shown to increase on both
clean and adversarial inputs. In this method, one only cares
about the classification of each of the M samples, and no
importance is given to their classifications certainties.
3.2. Soft prediction smoothing
In this case, we calculate the expectation of probability
of each class and use them for prediction generation:
g(x) = arg max
c
M∑
i=1
softmax(fi,c), (9)
This method was previously mentioned by Salman et al.
[30] as a way to apply adversarial training to a smoothed
classifier. Since the probabilities for each class are now
differentiable, this allows to train the classifier end-to-end.
In contrast to prediction smoothing, we now fully take into
account the classification probabilities of each of the M
samples. However, this defence is easier to overcome for
attackers. Often, even if the attack is not successful, the prob-
ability of competing classes increases significantly, which
means that the even unsuccessful attack on a base model
does affect the prediction of the smooth model.
3.3. Weighed smoothing
The two former methods can be generalized as follows:
In its most general form, the smoothed model output can be
written as
g(x) = arg max
y
M∑
i=1
V(fi,y), (10)
where V is some voting function: the indicator function
for prediction smoothing, and softmax for soft prediciton
Figure 1: Accuracy as a function of injected noise strength with different number of samples for a CPNI base model with
prediction smoothing for different attacks: no attack (left); PGD (middle); and EPGD (right).
Figure 2: Accuracy as a function of injected noise strength with 8 Monte Carlo samples for all base model and all smoothing
methods for different attacks: no attack (left); PGD (middle); and EPGD (right).
smoothing. We propose to assign some weight to top-k
predictions using, for example,
V (k) = 21−k, or (11)
Vc(k) =

1 k = 1
c k = 2
0 otherwise.
(12)
In particular, Vc expresses the dependency on the second
prominent class noted by Cohen et al. [10]. It is also possible
to take into account the prior of each class in the definition
of V . Assigning weights is a compromise between the hard
and soft prediction approaches in the sense that we take into
account the classifications probabilities of each of the M
samples.
3.4. Defence by random noise injection
To get some intuition on the effect of the noise injection
on adversarial attacks, we perform an analysis of a sim-
ple classification model – a support vector machine (SVM)
f(x) = w · x+ b with the parameters w and b. We look at
the formulation of SVM under adversarial attacks with zero-
mean random noise injected into the input. We assume that
the attacker is aware of this noise, but is limited to observing
the effect of a single realization thereof.
We start from the expectation of the SVM objective on a
single input sample xi:
Eη max
δ
max
[
1− yi(w · (xi + ηi − δi) + b), 0
]
, (13)
where ηi is the injected noise and δi is the adversarial noise.
Denoting δ′i = δi − ηi, we can, using the result of Xu et al.
[40], write the latter as
Eη max
δ
w · δ′i + max
[
1− yi(w · xi + b), 0
]
(14)
Since the expectation of η is 0, Eηw · ηi = 0, leading to
max
δ
w · δi + max
[
1− yi(w · xi + b), 0
]
, (15)
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Figure 3: Accuracy as a function of injected noise strength with different number of samples for Gauss (left) and EPGD-
diverged (right) with prediction smoothing for different attacks: EPGD (up) and PGD (down).
which is nothing but the SVM objective without injected
noise. Thus, the expectation of an adversarial attack will be
the same as that of an attack without the noise injection, and
it is unclear whether the attacker can devise a better strategy
to breach the defense effect provided by the noise injection.
The effect of noise injection is similar to random gradient
obfuscation. Let x be some input point, η a realization of
the random perturbation, δ the adversarial attack that would
have been chosen for x, and δ′ the adversarial attack that
would have been chosen for x+ η. Since we add noise to
the input in each forward iteration, the adversary computes
δ′ instead of δ which has some random distribution around
the true adversarial direction. Denoting by Πa the projection
on the direction chosen, by Π⊥ projection on the space
orthogonal to this direction, and by ‖δ‖p ≤  the Lp-bound
on the attack strength, yields
Π⊥(δ′) = Π⊥(η) ≡ η0 (16)
‖Πa(δ′)‖p =
(
p − ‖η0‖pp
)1/p
(17)
For p =∞, the second term equals . However, the first term
is a random variable that moves us further away from the
adversarial direction and therefore decreases the probability
of a successful adversarial attack. This effect accumulates
when the adversary attack computes the gradients multiple
times (such as in PGD).
4. Training a smoothed classifier
An obvious extension of the discussed method is to in-
corporate the smoothing into the training procedure. We
consider two approaches to training of the smoothed clas-
sifier: one based on prediction smoothing, and another one
based on soft prediction smoothing. In both cases, we start
from an adversarially pre-trained base model and fine-tune
it to improve the robustness of the smooth classifier.
4.1. Prediction smoothing training
In the case of prediction smoothing (or any other case in
which V is not differentiable), we cannot train the smoothed
model directly. We, therefore, want to train the base model
in a way that optimizes the loss of smoothed model. The 0-1
loss of n training samples is
L01 =
n∑
i=1
`01(yi, f˜θ(xi)) (18)
with the point-wise terms
`01(yi, f˜θ(xi)) = 1− 1
[
yi = arg max
y∈Y
Pη
[
fθ(xi + η) = y
]]
is minimized over the model parameters θ.
Denoting for brevity Py = Pη
[
fθ(xi + η) = y
]
, we can
approximate the indicator as
1
[
yi = arg max
y∈Y
Py
]
= 1
[
Pyi ≥ max
y′∈Y\{yi}
Py′
]
(19)
≈
[
Pyi − max
y′∈Y\{yi}
Py′
]
+
= max
y∈Y
[
Py − max
y′∈Y\{yi}
Py′
]
,
where we approximate the Heavyside function 1 with a
better-behaving ReLU function [·]+ on the interval [−1, 1].
The last equality follows from the fact that if yi is not the
most probable class then y = y′. The expression in Eq. (20)
resembles the bound Cohen et al. [10] has suggested for the
radius of certification from adversarial attacks.
We now show a relation to training the base model under
perturbation, similarly denoting 1y = 1[fθ(xi + η) = y]:
`01(yi, f˜θ(xi)) = 1−max
y∈Y
Eη1y + max
y′∈Y\{yi}
1y′ . (20)
Written in this form, the 0-1 loss is now amenable to Monte-
Carlo approximation, however working which such a non-
convex loss is problematic. We therefore bound the max
over the expectation by the expectation over the max,
`01(yi, f˜θ(xi)) ≤ 1− Eη max
y∈Y
1y + Eη max
y′∈Y\{yi}
1y′ .
Since the classification events are disjoint we obtain
L01 = Eη
 n∑
i=1
1−∑
y∈Y
1y +
∑
y′∈Y\{yi}
1y′

= Eη
[
n∑
i=1
1− 1yi
]
= Eη
n∑
i=1
`01(yi, fθ(xi)), (21)
which is the 0-1 loss of the base classifier under Gaussian
perturbation. This means that by injecting Gaussian noise
into input of the base classifier, we minimize the loss of
the smoothed one. η is not restricted to the Gaussian dis-
tributions as long as the above expectations exist; we could
combine Gaussian noise injection with adversarial training:
η ∼ N (0, σ2I) +B · δ
B ∼ Ber(q), (22)
where δ is the adversarial attack and q is the weight of ad-
versarial samples in the training procedure. Such adversarial
training under Gaussian perturbations relates to minimiz-
ing the 0-1 loss of the smoothed classifier under adversarial
attack. We refer to this method as “Gauss” further in text.
4.2. Soft smoothing training
The smoothing of the classifier gives rise to a new family
of attacks, which target the smoothed classifier rather than
the base model. In particular, in the case of soft smoothing,
the output of the smoothed classifier is differentiable and
thus can be used as a source of gradient for white box attack.
Salman et al. [30] discussed this family of attacks as a way to
improve the generalization of a base model and thus improve
certified accuracy of smooth model.
We consider adversarial training with such attacks as a
way to directly optimize the smoothed model by training the
base model. We expect it to increase the adversarial robust-
ness of both the base and the smoothed models. Specifically,
we consider PGD attacks, where at each iteration we com-
pute the gradients based on several randomized samples. We
chose to limit the number of samples to 8, since further im-
provement in the predicting ability is counter-balanced by
the increase in the computational complexity.
Perceptually aligned gradients. The aforementioned soft
smoothing attacks were previously explored in various ways.
Kaur et al. [20] have shown that targeted attacks of this kind
have perceptually-aligned gradients, i.e. they perturb the
input to make it resemble a member of a different class,
even for models that were not adversarially trained. In con-
trast, untargeted adversarial attacks exhibit this phenomenon
only on adversarially-trained models. In general, percep-
tual alignment of the gradients is an indirect evidence of
model robustness [17, 27]: we expect such a perturbation, if
strong enough, to be able to attack even a perfect classifier.
Such phenomena might indicate that adversarial training of
the model makes the adversarial attacks converge to soft
smoothing-based attacks.
Soft smoothing-based attacks. We, therefore, consider
using such attacks not only as a part of the training, but
rather as a viable way to produce effective adversarial attacks.
We could also expect such attacks to have lower variance,
as we are taking the expectation over a few samples, which
allows to find more effective perturbations with less effort. In
particular, we refer to such PGD-basd attacks as “expectaton
PGD” (EPGD). Notice that an EPGD attack with k PGD
steps andm samples requires computing the gradients k×m
times, making its computational cost comparable with that
of a PGD attack with k ×m steps.
4.3. Noise strength learning
He et al. [16] learned the variance of the noise injected
into the layers. This approach can be applied to the noise
injected to the input, in case we are not interested in certifi-
cation properties of the defence. In this scenario, we explore
the tradeoff between the adversarial robustness and the accu-
Table 1: Results of CPNI. Mean and standard deviation is
calculated over 10 runs for our experiments (upper half),
and over 5 runs for experiments by He et al. [16] (lower
half). Noise is injected either to weights (“W”) or output
activations (“A-a”). Best results for PNI and CPNI are set in
bold.
Method Accuracy, mean±std%
Clean PGD
PNI-W 82.84± 0.22 46.11± 0.43
CPNI-W 78.48± 0.41 48.84± 0.55
CPNI-A-a 83.41± 0.14 45.47± 0.18
CPNI-W+A-a 77.07± 0.40 46.07± 0.45
PNI-W 84.89± 0.11 45.94± 0.11
PNI-W+A-a 85.12± 0.10 43.57± 0.12
Table 2: Comparison of our method to prior art on CIFAR-
10.
Method Accuracy, mean±std%
Clean PGD
Madry et al. [26]a 83.84 39.14± 0.05
Jiang et al. [18] 85.31± 0.41 53.42± 1.07
He et al. [16] 82.84± 0.22 46.11± 0.43
Balaji et al. [4] 91.34 48.53
Sarkar et al. [31] 87.65 54.77
Smooth (our) 81.07± 0.01 58.56± 0.14
aresults by He et al. [16]
racy on clean samples, taking into account the quality of the
base classifier and amount of Monte Carlo samples.
4.4. Parametric noise injection and colored noise
Our method can be applied on top of any defense or even
with no defense at all. In particular, we implement a variant
of PNI, a defense proposed by He et al. [16], which we call
CPNI. The change is based on the fact that allowing the noise
to be correlated (colored) improves the performance of PNI.
In particular, we use multivariate Gaussian with a factorized
covariance matrix of the form σ = D +L>L, whereD is
diagonal matrix and L is n× r matrix. In particular, r = 5
enhances the adversarial accuracy by at least 2%, as shown
in Table 1.
5. Experiments
We study the performance of each of the proposed
smoothing methods (prediction, soft prediction, and weighed
smoothing) over 4 different base models: adversarially-
trained CPNI-W, and three additional models which were
obtained by fine-tuning the base model with training meth-
ods described in Section 4: EPGD and Gauss. For EPGD,
we selected two models chosen based on clean validation set
performance: one with the best validation accuracy (labelled
EPGD-converged) and with the worst validation accuracy
(EPGD-diverged). The motivation to consider the latter
arose since PGD and EPGD are highly similar in nature to
the point that PGD attacks converge to EPGD with adversar-
ial training, therefore training until convergence could result
in a model very similar to CPNI. We conjecture that this
is a sign of some form of overfitting of the smooth model,
which requires further investigation. For Gauss we tuned the
CPNI model based on the noise maximizing performance,
σ = 0.24. Our main focus is to explore the behavior of the
different smoothing methods, and thus we have not tried
to achieve best possible results by optimizing the hyper-
parameters of both the base and the smoothed classifier.
Experimental settings. On CIFAR-10, we trained the
CPNI base model with ResNet-20 for 400 epochs and chose
the model with the highest performance on a clean validation
set. We used SGD with the learning rate 0.1, reduced by
10 at epochs 200 and 300, weight decay 10−4, and colored
noise factorized covariance of rank r = 5. The obtained
model was fine-tuned with either EPGD adversarial training
or Gauss training for up to 200 epochs.
Comparison to other adversarial defences. We com-
pared the best-performing instance of the proposed defence
(EPGD-diverged with prediction smoothing and 256 sam-
ples) to the current state-of-the-art in adversarial defences
on CIFAR-10. This configuration achieves an improvement
of 4% over the best previous work and 10% over the PNI
baseline, as shown in Table 2.
Black box attacks. We tested our defence against black
box attacks, in particular, transferable attack [25]. For that
purpose, we trained another instance of CPNI-W model and
used it as a source model in three different configurations:
PGD without smoothing, PGD with smoothing, and EPGD
with smoothing. Results are reported in Table 4. Our model
performs well even if the source model is not smoothed,
which is an argument against a randomized gradient obfus-
cation effect.
Ablation study. We compared a different number of
Monte Carlo samples: 2n for 0 6 n 6 9. Since the dif-
ference between 16 and 512 samples is within one standard
deviation, we have not systematically studied any further
increase in the number of samples, which provides dimin-
ishing returns. However, in case where accuracy is more
important than the runtime, it might be feasible to use more
samples, since we have achieved as high as 59.3% accuracy
on PGD for 1024 samples with the EPGD-diverged model.
Table 3: Results of proposed defence for white box attacks (PGD and EPGD) on CIFAR-10. Mean and standard deviation over
5 runs is presented in form of mean±std.
Base Model Smoothing Method Iterations Noise Accuracy, mean±std
Clean PGD EPGD
CPNI-W Prediction 512 0.0 84.63± 0.05 52.8± 0.29 42.22± 0.01
CPNI-W Prediction 512 0.24 81.44± 0.06 55.92± 0.22 44.43± 0.11
EPGD-diverged Prediction 256 0.0 83.05± 0.01 57.31± 0.22 45.11± 0.14
EPGD-diverged Prediction 256 0.18 81.07± 0.01 58.56± 0.14 45.98± 0.15
EPGD-diverged Prediction 512 0.19 80.8± 0.01 58.32± 0.03 46.21± 0.08
EPGD-diverged Soft 512 0.0 83.13± 0.07 57.07± 0.15 44.47± 0.13
EPGD-diverged Soft 512 0.19 80.98± 0.07 58.32± 0.33 45.61± 0.18
EPGD-diverged Weighted 256 0.19 80.98± 0.07 58.47± 0.18 45.5± 0.2
EPGD-converged Prediction 256 0.22 81.82± 0.05 55.9± 0.37 44.85± 0.13
Gauss Prediction 256 0.37 81.25± 0.06 55.23± 0.37 44.53± 0.11
Table 4: Results of proposed defence applied on CPNI-W
with prediction smoothing for transferable attacks (PGD,
PGD-s (PGD with prediction smoothing in source model),
and EPGD) on CIFAR-10. Mean and standard deviation are
calculated over 5 runs.
Iterations Noise Accuracy, mean±std
PGD PGD-s EPGD
4 0.02 59.24± 0.35 58.88± 0.15 53.92± 0.32
8 0.02 60.38± 0.10 60.39± 0.14 55.16± 0.32
For each number of Monte Carlo samples, we consid-
ered multiple noise standard deviations in the range [0, 0.5].
Higher noise levels are not considered due to significant
degradation of the model performance. For each method,
we report clean (unperturbed) validation accuracy, as well
as adversarial accuracy for PGD and EPGD. We then re-
port a number of the best results for each base model and
smoothing method in Table 3, and a comparison of different
setups in Figs. 1 to 3. All our best results were obtained
with prediction smoothing, even for a low number of sam-
ples. Even though the advantage is of the order of a single
standard deviation, this performance difference is persistent
among base models, number of iterations, and attack types,
and thus is likely to be systematic. This could indicate that
the attacker can utilize additional information provided by
other methods better than the defender. In particular, as
shown in Table 3, EPGD-diverged has achieved the accuracy
under both PGD and EPGD attacks. The fact that EPGD
reduces performance of smoothed models proves that some
part of the defensive effect of smoothing is a consequence
of gradient obfuscation.
Fig. 2 demonstrates that there is a single optimal value
of noise strength for each base model, independent of the
smoothing method. This value is almost same for PGD
and EPGD, probably due to similarity of these two attacks.
For the CPNI and EPGD models, accuracy on clean data
reduces with the noise strength. The Gauss model is more
resilient to noise injection, acquiring maximum for around
40% higher standard deviation of the injected noise. This
can be related to the fact that the certified radius is twice
smaller than the standard deviation of the noise used in the
smoothed classifier.
In contrast to the certified robustness scheme [10], we
have not observed improvement of the Gauss model over
CPNI-W, which might be a result of the interference of the
CPNI-induced noise and the Gaussian noise.
In addition, we noted that smoothing without noise addi-
tion improves clean accuracy by as much as 3%. From Fig. 2
it is clear that EPGD-converged and CPNI base model result
in similar performance for all setups, except EPGD attack.
Performance for different attack strength We evaluated
our best-performing model against PGD attack with different
strength, , to study the effect of transferring defence on
attacks of different strength. Results are shown in Fig. 4.
6. Conclusions
We proposed an adversarial defense based on randomized
smoothing, which shows state-of-the-art results for white-
box attacks, namely PGD, on CIFAR-10 with a relatively
small number of iterations. We also confirm the efficiency
of our defense against black box attacks, by successfully
defending against transferring adversarial examples from
various models. Our method offers a practical trade-off
between the inference time and model performance and can
be incorporated into any adversarial defense.
In addition, we proposed to utilize a family of attacks that
take smoothing into account against smoothed classifiers.
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Figure 4: Accuracy of CPNI-W model with prediction
smoothing over 8 iterations under PGD attack with different
attack radius. Standard deviation is smaller than line width.
We showed its superiority over existing attacks and demon-
strated the importance of smoothing against those attack.
We show that adversarial training of smoothed classifier is a
non-trivial task and study several approaches to it.
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